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Introduction
In the Referendumon theUK’smembership
of the European Community in 1975, the official
document released by the government (Britain’s
NewDeal in Europe) noted that improving the deal
in relation to ‘food’ was one of the objectives of the
renegotiation (the otherswere ‘money’ and ‘jobs’).
Much of the debate centred on food security and
prices, with those in favour of staying in arguing
that thesewere ‘no higher’ than if the UK remained
outside, while those advocatingwithdrawal insisted
thatmembership had increased food prices, and
also kept them ‘artificially high’. The pamphlet
issued by theNational ReferendumCampaign
(Why you should voteNO) said that ‘if we had our
own national agricultural policy suited to our own
country, aswe had beforewe joined... We could
then guarantee prices for our farmers, and, at
the same time, allow consumers to buymuch
more cheaply’. By contrast, while the Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP) still accounts for nearly
40 per cent of the EU budget, agriculture, food and
rural affairs are barelymentioned in the literature
on theBrexit referendum in 2016, and have been
largely peripheral in the ‘national’ debate. The
official Government pamphlet focuses on how the
renegotiationwill allow theUK tomaintain border
controls, restrict access towelfare formigrants,
and reduce red tape. It has just one reference to
food (in a table indicating the economic importance
of the singlemarket) and an indirect reference to
howBrexit would lead to higher prices for some
household goods that is illustrated by a picture
of a basket of food shopping.
Nonetheless there has been a vigorous debate
about Brexit within the agriculture and food
communities (see for example the reports on
written by academic specialists for the Yorkshire
Agriculture Society1 (YAS) and theWorshipful
Company of Farmers, and the paper by Food
Research Collaboration). Some of these
contributions aim to inform the debate by providing
accessible information about the implications of
remain/leave for UK agriculture and food (without
‘telling people how to vote’), others take a partisan
stance, but there is broad agreement on themain
ssues. In the YAS paper thesewere identified as:
options for theUK’s political and trade relationships;
farm support and budgetmatters; world trade
issues; agriculture and the environment; animal
health andwelfare; plant protection; geographical
indications; geneticallymodified organisms (GMOs);
migrant labour; and territorial considerationswithin
the UK. Some of these issues are considered below.
Political and trade relationships
Much discussion in the debate has focused on
what sort of political and trade deals the UK
might be able to negotiate after leaving the EU,
and the feasibility of the ‘alternatives’ (crucial for
farmers because of the relatively high tariff
barriers that the EU imposes onmany agricultural
and food products). The YAS report identified five
possible options situated on a continuum from
themost integrated (customs union) to least
integrated (EU and the UK tradewith each other
asMost FavouredNation trade partnerswithin
theWorld Trade Organisation [WTO] system)
(YAS, pp. 33-35; see also Buckwell pp. 25-30, where
he discusses seven options and Swinbank 2016
where eleven possible scenarios are outlined!).
1 I was part of this collaboration and would like to acknowledge the help and support received frommy colleaguesWyn Grant, Michael Cardwell,
Christopher Rogers, Fiona Smith and Alan Swinbank, as well as the assistance of the Yorkshire Agricultural Society. While this briefing paper is grounded
in this work, interpretations aremine alone.
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A common observation is that in some of these
arrangements the UKwould still have to comply
with EU SingleMarket ruleswithout having any
say in their development, and perhaps still have to
make financial contributions (as is the casewith
theNorwegian option). As a pro-Remain letter to
The Times, signed by nearly forty senior figures in
the UK agri-food sector, put it, ‘Wewould pay, but
lose our say’ (5March 2016).
Also important will be howBrexit would impact on
the UK’s trade arrangements under theWTO. The
YAS report sets out several possible options but
overall is certain that after EUwithdrawal ‘UK farm
policy would not be able to return to the unfettered
use of high levels of domestic support, export
subsidies and import tariffs’ and that some limits
will be imposed by theWTO (YAS 2016, p. 30). In a
technical report for theNational Farmers’ Union
(NFU) Jongeneel at al. examine the potential impact
on agricultural production, trade, and farm income
under several trade scenarios. In the nine trade and
political scenarios theymodel, the effects of Brexit
ismixed in terms of price and production levels
but largely negative in relation to farm incomes,
especially where the level of payments to farmers
are reduced. There are important variations in the
effects on incomes between farm types, with the
unsupported horticulture sector doingwell outside
the EU on all scenarios, but the livestock sector
faring badly (Jongeneel et al. 2016, p. 30). Generally
they highlight the UKs ‘very strong integrationwith
EU agriculturalmarkets’ in relation to imports (70%)
and exports (over 60%), and also argue that because
the biggest driver of farm incomes is the level of
subsidies therewould be important consequences
if this support was removed, notably in the livestock
sector (2016, p. 26).
As neatly summarised by Buckwell, the trade
question ‘is fundamentally a choice between
remaining close to the EU singlemarket, and
therefore having to retainmost existing EU
regulation, or leaving the SingleMarket in order to
allow some deregulation’ (2016, p. 4). As the YAS
report noted, the key objective for the UK after
Brexit would be ‘to have continued access to the
SingleMarket... while eliminating or reducing the
impact of those EU regulations that are seen as
harmful to British interests’ (YAS 2016, p. 33).
However the issue is one for the economy as awhole
and ‘it is very unlikely that agri-food interestswould
be a decisive factor’ in determining the shape of
the post-withdrawal trade regime (YAS 2016, p. 33).
Moreover not all of the possibilitiesmaybeacceptable
to the EU and the outcome of negotiations is not
simply amatter of choice for the UK.
Agriculture policy and farm support
Much of the Brexit debate about agriculture and
food reflects long-standing disagreement about
whether the CAP is beneficial to the UK. As Buckwell
comments, ‘escaping’ the CAP is often portrayed
‘as one of the prizes of withdrawal from the EU’
(2016, p. 31). Echoing the ‘No’ case in 1975, the Vote
Leave campaign (Vote Leave, TakeControl) claims that
leaving the EUwould ‘allow theUK to regain control
of food bills’. Much ismade of the failings of the CAP,
especially that it is wasteful, expensive, bureaucratic,
ineffective, harmful to the environment, and imposes
burdensome rules that drive up costs.
SomeBrexiteers envisage amuchmore freemarket
approach inwhich food is bought fromwherever
it is cheapest –what Buckwell calls the ‘cold bath’
in which the agricultural sector is deregulated to
compete freely on theworldmarket with all financial
support removed (2016, p. 23). However the general
assumption on the Leave side is that the CAPwill be
replaced by national policies. Vote Leave argues that
by enabling the UK to take back control over policy
(decided by ‘our own peoplewho fully understand the
UK industry and environment’), Brexit would allow
theUK to ‘fix the problems farming faces’. Yet
criticism of the CAP also is voiced bymany of those
in favour of staying in, but they tend to see the
solution as policy reformwithin the EU. The FRC
report for example argues that the CAP is inefficient,
wasteful, and in need of further substantial reform,
but not ‘abandonment’. The case for ‘Bremain’ is
that the UK ‘can put its huge negotiatingweight
behind supporting progressive change’ in both
the EU food and farming systems (Lang and Schoen
2016, p. 2).
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Under the CAP, the UK receives around £2.5 to
£3bn a year (three quarters of which goes to direct
payments and a quarter to agri-environment and
rural development under pillar 2). Direct payments
account for over half of total farm income,
agri-environment and other payments for a further
15 per cent (Grant 2016, p. 12). Given that the UK
contributes roughly twice asmuch to the CAP as
it gets back, Brexit would ‘reduceUK budget
expenditure on agriculture’ but by howmuch
depends onwhether direct payments are retained
and at what level (Jongeneel et al. 2016, p. 31).
However the great unknowns are precisely the
extent towhich agricultural supportmight be
retained after Brexit, whowould pay for it andwho
would benefit. The Vote Leave campaign has argued
that after Brexit the UKwould be able to ‘continue,
or even increase, the subsidies that our farmers
receive’. This was controversially echoed by
pro-Leave farmingminister George Eustacewho
claimed that ‘the truth of thematter is that if we
left the EU therewould be an £18bn a year dividend,
so couldwe find themoney to spend £2bn a year
on farming and the environment? Of coursewe
could.Wouldwe?Without a shadow of a doubt’
(TheGuardian, 24 Feb 2016).
Europe and Sub-State Nationalism
At first sight, sub-state nationalism like that of
the ScottishNational Party (SNP)might seem
incompatiblewith European integration, the one
seeking smaller units and the latter a larger one.
Yet this is not necessarily so, particularly as the
idea of the nation-state itself is being transformed
by global trends and, especially, European
integration. Small states are vulnerable economically
andmilitarily and often feel the need for an
overarching systemof international law and
regulation. They also need guarantees of access to
largermarkets than they can provide domestically.
Although between theworldwarsmany of them
joined in the dominant protectionist ethos, since
the SecondWorldWar they have tended to favour
freer trade. Even in the late nineteenth century,
many of the nationalistmovements in central and
eastern Europe (and in Ireland) favoured home
rulewithin reformed and democratised imperial
systems, conscious of their ownvulnerability in the
neighbourhoodof great powers.
In recent years, the EuropeanUnion has provided
such a framework. Basque and Catalan nationalists
were among the strongest supporters of a united
Europe from the 1930s and have continued to be so.
Irishmoderate nationalists (the SDLP) are strongly
pro-Europe. The SNPhad an interest in Europe in the
1950s but by the 1970s had turned against, although
the pro-Europeanwing remained as aminority.
In themid-1980s they changed their position again,
to independence-in-Europe.
Irrespective of the controversy about what the UK
pays into the EU andwhat it gets back, this argument
displays a naïveté about where farming and food
sit as a political and spending priority. No serious
political commentator sees any likelihood of farmers
receiving higher subsidies after Brexit. As Grant
says, the Treasurymay see Brexit ‘as an opportunity
to reduce the overall cost of payments to farmers’
or even to ask the devolved administrations to
assume part of the burden, although this would be
strongly resisted (2016, p. 13). The likelihood is that
total paymentswill be somewhat lower than those
received under the CAP and be funded by the
Treasury. A return to a systemof payments linked to
production (such as the deficiency payments system
which existed before EU entry) is unlikely. Rather
path-dependence in agricultural policy – reinforced
by on-going funding commitments and political and
economic constraints (including the power of the
farm lobby) - willmean thatmuch of the CAPwill
remain, at least in the short tomedium term. Both
Swinbank andBuckwell envisage substantial
continuity in policy objectives and programmes,
with the continuation of direct payments and the
main elements of rural development programmes
such as agri-environment schemes. At the very least,
transition arrangementswill be needed because
immediatewithdrawal from the CAPwould cause
great disruption and have a catastrophic impact
on the farm incomes for ofmany producers
(YAS 2016, p. 4).
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The potential for greatest controversywill be
about whether (and by howmuch) to restructure
farmpayments away fromdirect payments to
support the provision of public goods, for example
on rural development, environmental sustainability
and climate change. The consensus across the
reports is that direct payments are vulnerable and
likely to be reduced, whereas rural development
fundingmay actually increase (YAS 2016, p. 31).
Not only is this consistent with themain lines of
UK government policy (the Treasury dislikes direct
payments) and likely to be strongly supported by the
environmental and conservation lobbies, but it is
also probable because agri-environment and other
rural development programmes are contractually
based andwill have to continue for several years
after Brexit. Nonetheless given the political
pressures it is likely that direct paymentswill
remain at a reduced level (at the very least for
a transition period), and be linked to some
conditionality requirements (efficiency and
sustainability for example).
Regulation
In broad terms, EU ‘red tape’ is a core issue in
the Brexit debate. There is an extensive suite of
regulation that applies to the agri-food sector,
including cross-compliance in agri-environment
programmes, nitrate vulnerable zones and habitats,
and the regulation of areas such as plant protection,
animal health andwelfare, geographic indications
and pesticides (for a discussion of these see YAS
2016). Undoubtedly a core complaint of farmers
(and central for those in favour of Brexit) relates to
‘the transaction costs involved in form filling and
what are seen as the unduly onerous nature of some
regulations’ (Grant 2016, p. 14). This is particularly
emphasised by the Vote Leave campaign, which
suggests that Brexit would end the EU’s ‘nightmare
bureaucracy’ including the ‘rough justice of the
“cross compliance regime”’ and lead to the
dismantling the ‘thousands of badly designed EU
regulations that aim to control everything farmers
do’. The UKwould also be able to ‘take back control’
of issues such as the regulation of pesticides and
GMOs, where the attitude of the EU ‘has caused
major companies such as BASF tomove out of
the EU to the United States’.
There is great uncertainty about the status of
EU legislation post Brexit but it is likely that the
UKwould retain the existing regulatory framework,
at least in the short term. In the longer term,
the prospects for substantial deregulation seem
slim.Maintaining a level playing field for trade
for examplewillmean that ‘the regulatory burden
might not be reduced asmuch as farmersmight
hope’ (YAS 2016, p. 31). IndeedUK farmers can
shelter under the power of the agricultural lobby
in the EU as awhole, andwere this political cover
to be removed ‘environmental, conservationist,
consumer, public health and animal welfare lobbies
(stronger in the UK than in othermember states)
would continue to be influential and to exert
pressure formore stringent regulation of agriculture’
(YAS 2016, p. 31). As Buckwell also points out,
because competitors in the EUwill be on their
guard against the UK trying to secure a competitive
advantage through deregulation, ‘a safe assumption’
is that ‘therewill not be a significant dismantling’ of
regulation, although ‘theremay be a less precautious
approach to biotechnology and pesticide licensing’
(2016, p. 57).
Overall, the consensus seems to be that ‘farmers
should not expect a “bonfire of controls” after Brexit’
(Grant 2016, p. 14). The letter to The Times signed by
leading figures in the agri-food industry added that
‘some of theworst regulations, aswell as the
‘gold-plating’ of EU directives, happen in the UK,
not Brussels.’ For former Deframinister JimPaice,
while itmight be possible to abolish someEU
regulations, ‘it doesn’tmean theywould not be
replaced by UK ones to address the same issues.
The pressure groups and the “somethingmust
be done brigade”would still be here and any
governmentwill bow to them’.
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Territorial issues
The territorial dimension is a common theme in
most of the analyses about the implications of Brexit
for the agri-food industry. Debates in Scotland,
Wales andNorthern Ireland are framed by broader
politicalmatters –whether a vote to leave the EU
would spark another referendumon independence
in Scotland, and its impact on the political settlement
in Northern Ireland for example.Whether devolved
governments are controlled by nationalists or
unionists is also important. So the Cabinet Secretary
for Rural Affairs (Richard Lochhead) in the SNP
government has criticised the ‘atrocious budgets
negotiated by the UKGovernment’ that has put
Scotland ‘bottomof the European league tables’
for CAP funding (Scottish Government 2014).
In Northern Ireland Sinn Féin complains that
agriculture and fisheries policy are examples
of UK actions that ‘put British needs first’ and ignore
‘the reality that the economies north and south are
interlinked and interdependent’.
Most of the elite political actors in the devolved
territories are strong advocates for remaining in
the EU. This reflects a conviction that the broader
economic effects of Brexit are likely to be negative,
and substantially adverse for the agri-food sector in
particular. For example, Richard Lochhead told the
Oxford Farming Conference in January 2015, that the
CAP provided a ‘protective shield’ and that leaving
the EU ‘would be a disaster’ for the UK’s farmers’
and ‘leave producers at themercy of themarket
– amarket where our direct competitors continue
to receive direct support’ (The Guardian, 7 January
2015). A report by theNorthern Ireland Affairs Select
Committee (May 2016) concluded that a post-Brexit
deal between the EU andWTO could be very
damaging andwas sceptical about whether the UK
governmentwould look after regional economic
interests, both in terms of replacing lost subsidies
and in negotiating a newdeal with the EU (Belfast
Telegraph,May 27).
In 2014 the UK received over four billion euro from
the CAP (see Table 1) but while England takes the
lions share (because it hasmore farmers), the other
territories are ‘evenmore dependent’ on direct
payments because of the predominance of extensive
livestock enterprises, especially in upland less
favoured areas (Grant 2016, p. 12).
TABLE1: Payments from theCAP, 2014
Total CAP
payments €million of which Pillar 1
England 2,714 (63%) 2,048 (75.4%)
Scotland 757 (18%) 566 (74.7%)
Wales 413 (9%) 301 (72.8%)
NI 415 (10%) 319 (76.9)
Source: Agriculture in the UK 2014, p. 68.
Buckwell also notes that CAP payments per capita
‘are over twice as high in Scotland andWales,
and almost three times higher in Northern Ireland
than in England’, with a ‘generally a higher degree
of dependence on CAP payments’ because of their
livestock-based farming sectors (2016, pp. 55-6).
Farmers’ leaders in the territories are concerned
about the level of funding after Brexit. The Ulster
Farmers’ Union, has cast doubt on the claim by
pro-Brexit Secretary of State, Teresa Villiers, that
‘some formof support for Northern Irish farmers
will certainly continue in the event of a Brexit’ and
that therewould be ‘extramoney available for
support if the UKwere no longermaking an EU
budget contribution’ (NI Affairs Committee, para. 66).
The relationship between the UK and the Republic
of Ireland is also important and generally there is
worry about the potential adverse consequences of
the reintroduction of a controlled land border. Some
argue that this could destabilise thewhole of the
political settlement (Todd2015) aswell as complicate
trade relations (Matthews 2015). InMarch 2015 the
Irish government set up a unit to examine the
implications of Brexit (Ireland is the largest
destination for UK farmexports, and also is the third
largest importer of food into the UK). For Taoiseach
EndaKenny, ‘while we are respectful of the
democratic debatewhich is ongoing in the UK, it is
impossible to remain silent on an issuewhich
impinges so directly on Ireland’s national interests’
(Irish Times 13March 2015). The general view, as
encapsulated byMatthews, is that Brexit ‘would be
unambiguously bad from the perspective of both
Irish producers and consumers’ (2015, p. 20), and
this surely underlies the appealmade by Kenny for
Irish people living in Britain to vote to remain in the
EU (TheGuardian, 28May 2016).
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Under the CAP, policy differentiation across the
territories has been possible, for example on the
mechanisms adopted for the implementation
of the Single FarmPayment, in the level of funding
transferred fromdirect payments to rural
development under the 2014 CAP reform, and in the
construction of Rural Development Programmes.
If Brexit becomes a reality, such variation can be
expected to continue, if not increase. This is likely
to spark controversy about ‘level playing fields’
within the UK. Politically, however, the territorial
aspectmay act as a sort of limiting brake on the
extent of possible reconfiguration of agricultural
policy post-Brexit. AsMatthews notes, the Treasury
‘is unlikely to cut all spending in terms of direct
payments, if only because these are hugely
important to farmers inNorthern Ireland, Scotland
andWales, but a lower level can be expected’ (2015,
p. 13). Muchwill depend on the nature of the funding
arrangements but there ismuch potential for
substantial controversy about the division of
resources between the territories, including those
for agriculture.
ThePolitical Views of Farmers
Given the substantial resources delivered to
agriculture under the CAP, it has often been
assumed that farmers –while critical of aspects
of policy such as red tape –would be amongst
those least likely to favour Brexit. However,
as Buckwell notes, when asked ‘if they have
benefitted from the CAP,many farmers and
their representative organisations are distinctly
lukewarmabout the CAP if not hostile’ (2016, p. 16).
If we take the views of themain farmorganisations
as indicative, at the elite level the consensus is
that Brexit would be damaging for the agri-food
sector. In the letter to The Times, the senior figures
in the agri-food sector, described leaving the EU
as ‘a nightmare scenario’ and a ‘riskwe cannot
afford to take’. It wouldmean ‘reducing our access
to ourmost importantmarket, little or no reduction
in regulation, no influence on future rules, the
speedy abolition of direct support and an uncertain
future for UK agriculture.’
Themain farmers unions have taken a strongly
evidence-based approach, for example the study
commissioned by theNFU fromWageningen
University (see Jongeneel et al 2016). On the basis
of such analyses and the ‘balance of existing
evidence’, it concluded that ‘the interests of farmers
are best served by our continuingmembership
of the EuropeanUnion’, a stance shared by its
counterparts in the other territories. For the
Ulster Farmers Union, there is ‘a lack of clarity’
about the issues and ‘no compelling reason’ to
leave the EU (NI Affairs Committee 2016, para. 61).
However, reflecting the divisionswithin their
memberships, the unions’ have not actively
campaigned in the referendumand are at pains
to point out that it is not for them to tellmembers
how to vote (not least because there arewider
issues beyond agriculture at stake).While the
claim by the Vote Leave campaign that opinion
polls show that ‘twice asmany farmers’ are in
favour of Brexitmay be an exaggeration, it does
seem clear that substantial numbers of farmers
are in favour of leaving the EU.What polling that
has taken place is contradictory –while a survey
by theNFU in the autumn of 2015 suggested that
52 per cent favoured Remain (26 per cent to Leave),
a poll of its readers conducted by FarmersWeekly
in April 2016 found 58 per cent of farmers in favour
of Brexit (31 per cent for Remain). This poll also
suggested that farmers in Scotland,Wales and the
NorthWest of England are less inclined to vote
Leave than those in other regions (FarmersWeekly,
29 April 2016). In terms of farm type, farmers in
sectors not financially supported by the CAP lean
more towards the Leave argument (for example in
horticulture – although this is tempered by the
demand formigrant labour), beef and sheep
producers aremore likely to favour remaining in the
EU. Among those in favour of Leave, ‘EU regulation
and policies’ are themajor concern; those in favour
of remain aremost concerned aboutmarket access
and the future of farm subsidies.
7Enlightening the European Debate
Conclusions
Liz Truss, Secretary of State for the Environment,
Food andRural Affairs, summed up the pro-EU
positionwhen she said that ‘by voting to remainwe
canworkwithin a reformed EU to reduce bureaucracy
and secure further reformwhile still enjoying the
significant benefits of the singlemarket’, and that in
times of price volatility andmarket uncertainty,
‘it would bewrong to take a leap into the dark’
(TheGuardian, 24 Feb 2016). On the other hand,
the arguments for Leave largely are rooted in the
optimistic assumption that because the UK pays
more into the EU than it gets back, therewill be little
difficulty inmaintaining subsidies. As Vote Leave
claims, by leaving the EU ‘we take back control over
howwe produce our food -we can continue, or even
increase, the subsidies that our farmers receive and
end the obscenewaste...A vote to remain is a vote to
be tied to the EU’s nightmare bureaucracy forever’.
What seems clear is that a vote to leave the EU
‘will createmassive uncertainty and anxiety in the UK
food and farming sector’ (Buckwell 2016, para. 51).
While political pressureswill likely fight off
demands for the abolition of subsidies and extensive
deregulation, some reduction in levels of agricultural
support is likely. However Buckwell also suggests
that after the initial shock effects, in the long term
British agriculture ‘could be a less precarious,more
resilient industry capable of dealingwith the inevitable
challenges it will continue to face not least from
climate change’, although this will depend ‘on the
intelligence of the policy debate’ that follows (2016,
para. 53). The broad problem in the debate, as Alan
Matthews succinctly points out, is that it ‘is impossible
tomake any sensible evaluation, because no one
knows the agricultural, trade, budgetary and
regulatory policies that would be put in place if the UK
did vote to leave’ (FarmersWeekly, 21 February 2016).
Nonetheless as Grant and the YAS report rather
cautiously conclude, it is difficult to see that the
consequences of Brexit for agriculture ‘would,
on balance, be advantageous.’
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